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When Kaplan (2009) published “The Revenge of Geog-
raphy” in Foreign Policy, Karen Hooper sent the article 
to fellow analysts at the private intelligence firm Strat-
for (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.), prompting one of them, 
Mark Schroeder, to wonder, “[d]id this dude steal from 
us?” George Friedman, the founder and CEO of Stratfor, 
reassured his colleagues that “Kaplan is a real smart guy,” 
and Bayless Parsley, Middle East analyst at Stratfor, spe-
cialist among other things in “proofreading, geopolitical 
analysis” (Parsley 2013a), urged them to “read ‘[B]alkan 
[G]hosts.’ [T]hat’s the reason I went to the [B]alkans,” 
before noting with admiration that “[K]aplan was also 
writing about the [C]aucasus before anyone knew how 
to spell it. [E]ither called it ‘[O]nward to [T]atary [sic]’ 
or ‘[E]astward to [T]atary [sic]’ (Parsley 2013b; cf. Kaplan 
2000b). Friedman viewed Kaplan’s work as symptomatic 
of a pressing need: “When geopolitics is required, it shows 
itself in many places” (Parsley 2013b). Kaplan is now chief 
geopolitical analyst for Stratfor after Friedman identified 
him for his colleagues as someone he “would trust with my 
legacy” and who could “mentor the analysts” at Stratfor 
(Friedman 2012). Cometh the hour, then.
Yet Kaplan has not always presented his work as geopoli-
tics. In a foreword for one edition of Balkan Ghosts, he 
claimed that the book was “essentially … a travel book 
that has … acquired a public policy significance which I 
never intended” (Kaplan 1996b, ix). The subtitle of Balkan 
Ghosts was “A Journey Through History,” and The Ends of 
the Earth (Kaplan 1996a) was subtitled, “A Journey at the 
Dawn of the 21st Century,” and Eastward to Tartary (2000b) 
had as its subtitle, “Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East 
and the Caucasus.” Upon its republication (Kaplan 2003b), 
the 1988 work, Surrender or Starve, lost as subtitle, “The 
Wars Behind the Famine” and acquired, “Travels in Ethio-
pia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea,” whereas Kaplan’s survey 
of the western United States, An Empire Wilderness (Ka-
plan 1998), was subtitled “Travels into America’s Future.” 
Travel was Kaplan’s first love.
Following Fussell (1980), Kaplan celebrates the glory days 
of travel writing, before prepackaged tours, and when 
itineraries and obsessions were fed by the study of his-
tory and literature. In those times, travel writers “were 
generally not concerned with geopolitics,” although their 
“uncanny ability … to describe a scene resulted periodi-
cally in insightful political analysis” (Kaplan 2004, 188, 
189). In some measure, Kaplan shares a common travel-
ing trait in offering discomfort as his witness. From West 
Africa, he reported that “on foot … you learn the most. 
You are on the ground, on the same level with Africans 
rather than looking down at them. You are no longer pro-
tected by speed or air-conditioning or thick glass. The 
sweat pours from you, and your shirt sticks to your body. 
This is how you learn” (Kaplan 1996a, 25). On a train in 
1998, unease hinted at geopolitics: “[t]he compartment 
was now jammed with people standing in the aisles: men 
with outlandish clothes, shaven heads and unshaven fac-
es, and the most violent of expressions, spitting, coughing 
in my face, and stepping on my feet as ashes from their 
cigarettes. Profanity ruled. The middle-aged couple across 
from me cowered in fear as the train slowly crossed with 
wide Danube into Bulgaria” (Kaplan 2000b, 57). “Travel 
is work” (Kaplan 2004, 185) that takes you to places not 
often seen by your kind, and whence you report of things 
not often experienced by your people. In Colombia, he 
welcomed an opportunity to travel in an armored car with 
U.S. Special Forces through Arauca, a “ratty hellhole” of 
a town because “[a]ll the briefings in the world were not as 
revealing as the indefinable essences gleaned from visual 
contact” (Kaplan 2005, 82, 81).
Travel is a distinct way of learning, privileging the visual, 
and Kaplan reads eyes as windows on the soul. In a refu-
gee camp in the Ivory Coast, Kaplan met a Liberian who 
had spent time in California: “I warmed to his eyes. Their 
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136 THE AAG REVIEW OF BOOKS
aspect was western—just barely though” (1996a, 22). At 
the Liberian border, he saw another “young, muscular 
man [who] stood stoically by the side of the road, wearing 
an Elvis T-shirt. His eyes were terrifyingly vacant. There 
was no economy here, nothing” (1996a, 27). In Romania, 
he reflected on the “unusually high standard of efficiency” 
brought to the town of Sibiu by its Saxons before noting 
of one young man that “[h]is flaxen hair and intelligent-
looking blue eyes betrayed him as a Saxon” (Kaplan 1994, 
174, 175). Of course, these impressions were formed se-
lectively and with hindsight for Kaplan spoke in English 
with the man in the refugee camp, and in German with 
the blond Romanian. The vacant eyes of “Elvis” were 
never animated by conversation, and yet the judgment is 
made, pretty vacant.
Western-centric perspectives often register otherness as 
lack. Traveling with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan for 
periods in the second half of the 1980s, Kaplan (2001, 
17) remarked of his hosts, “Their Moslem fundamental-
ism lacks political meaning because Afghanistan, unlike 
the Arab world and Iran, never had an invasion of West-
ern culture and technology to revolt against.” He reached 
this conclusion without the benefit of intimate conversa-
tion because “Arabic (and Persian too) was a language I 
disdained, even though I knew the alphabet and a few 
simple phrases. Like Greek, Arabic struck me as a flowery, 
ostentatious language structured for poetry and dema-
goguery, but without Greek’s flair for intellectual subtle-
ty” (Kaplan 2001, 107). Nevertheless, and in a chapter 
entitled “Noble Savages,” Kaplan (2001, 108) explained 
how he had reached a more positive view of Islam, at least 
in Afghanistan, for here it was, he concluded, a matter 
of genuine piety and not the “collective hysteria” of Iran. 
These Afghan tribesmen had no need of an ideological 
union imposed by an autocratic regime; never having 
lost their aboriginal faith, they displayed Islam as “it was 
originally intended to be” (Kaplan 2001, 109). It is in the 
modern world of states not tribes, of politics not tradition, 
that difference becomes threat. Safe in the past, the other 
might remain a noble savage.
Travelers come from the modern world and are struck 
by what they find exotic, or uncomfortable about the 
places they suffer to visit. But they are also disposed to 
explain the first in terms of the second. Kaplan (1996a, 4, 
7) finds that “[a]t the equator nature is a terrifying face 
from which humankind cannot separate itself,” that “[i]
t almost certainly is not accidental that Africa is both 
the poorest and hottest region in the world,” and that in 
traveling to Ends of the Earth he could explain “humanity 
in each locale as literally an outgrowth of the terrain and 
climate in which it was fated to live.” Kaplan is particu-
larly wary of forests. He argues that Russian civilization 
has been shaped by its origins: “Clustered in the forest 
with their enemies lurking on the steppe, the Russians 
took refuge in both animism and religion” (Kaplan 2012, 
159). In fear of the Mongols from the steppes, Kaplan be-
lieves that Russians learned to accept totalitarian govern-
ment. Of Liberia, he remarks that in a forest “where one’s 
view is blotted out by every manner of tree and creeper 
(each containing its own ‘spirit’), men tend to depend less 
on reason and more on superstition,” producing “an inde-
finable wildness” so that “perhaps, the forest had made 
the war in Liberia. I have no factual basis for this, merely 
traveler’s intuition” (Kaplan 1996a, 28, 27). Traveler’s in-
tuition is casually environmentalist.
Modernity, states, and cosmopolitanism stall atavistic 
identities forged in long communion with variegated na-
ture. The past might again be the future, or as Kaplan 
(2012, xx) puts it, “With the political ground shifting 
rapidly under one’s feet, the map, though not determi-
native, is the beginning of discerning a historical logic 
about what might come next.” And this is how Kaplan 
travels into geopolitics. In Arizona, he sees waxing In-
dian and waning federal power and from the map of In-
dian territories, he discerns a new landscape animated by 
old enmities: “The reemergence of North America’s vast 
and increasingly vast archipelago, with its resurgence of 
ethnic consciousness … can only lead to increased con-
flict among the Indian tribes themselves as the power of 
the federal and state governments declines. A more po-
litically and economically significant Indian America will 
likely be a divided, balkanized Indian America” (Kaplan 
1998, 188). In this respect, Kaplan’s taste for classical his-
tory becomes an urgent way to read the present.
Kaplan (2004, 17) has always sought out “books linked to 
the landscapes and seascapes through which I traveled.” 
He assures us that Gibbons’ The History of the Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–1789) has a scent of 
“disturbing freshness” because it “instructs that human 
nature never changes, and that mankind’s predilection 
for faction, augmented by environmental and cultural 
differences, is what determines history” (Kaplan 2000a, 
111, 113). For Kaplan (2004, 90), “[m]yths offer ultimate, 
condensed truth.” In this respect, “[a]ncient history … is 
the surest guide to what we are likely to face in the early 
decades of the twenty-first century” (Kaplan 2002, 14). In 
reading classical history so that he can take an informed 
interest in the landscapes and places that were its setting, 
Kaplan finds other lessons, not about history, but about 
modern politics and international relations. Reading 
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Livy’s account of the wars between Carthage and Rome, 
Kaplan (2002, 32) sees in Hannibal a “pre-technological 
Hitler.” More fatefully, however, he also suggests that 
“Livy shows that the vigor it takes to face our adversar-
ies must ultimately come from pride in our own past and 
our achievements. Romanticizing our past is something 
to be cultivated, rather than to be ashamed of” (Kaplan 
2002, 36). Although we should idealize our past, we must 
not idealize the international present. We should judge 
ends not means and must learn to abjure any philosophy 
of humility and self-abnegation; rather, we should follow 
Machiavelli and embrace “a pagan ethic that elevated self-
preservation over the Christian ethic of sacrifice, which he 
considered hypocritical” (Kaplan 2002, 52).
This reading of ancient history legitimates a tragic world-
view. In this fallen world, “idealism shorn of … realism is 
immoral” (Kaplan 2003a, xv). Because, in the mid-1980s, 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter would not intervene with 
force in Ethiopia, his gift of food aid exacerbated conflict 
fueling the communist production of management of fam-
ine for sectarian ends that “should cure those in the West 
of the delusion that humanitarian means are sufficient 
to achieve humanitarian ends in Africa” (Kaplan 2003b, 
159). It was held by some that Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, in 
arguing that the Balkans were scored through with an-
cient hatreds, helped those advisors of President Clinton 
who were cautious about an armed intervention seem-
ingly bound to founder in the face of tribal blood feuds. 
Kaplan called this use of his work, cynical and styled the 
noninterventionist position, “Western cowardice,” mak-
ing it clear that he wanted “strong military intervention 
against the Bosnian Serbs” (Kaplan 1996c). By the end of 
the last century, Kaplan (2000a, 181) was bemoaning the 
“deformities of domestic peace,” which he saw as draining 
politics and culture of seriousness. Kaplan (2005, 3). He 
applauded the posture of President Bush after the attacks 
of 11 September 2001, noting with evident satisfaction 
that “by the turn of the twenty-first century the United 
States military had already appropriated the entire earth, 
and was ready to flood the most obscure areas of it with 
troops at a moment’s notice.”
In this spirit, Kaplan (2005, 11, 14) went out on patrol 
with the U.S. military to explore the reality of empire, 
which he characterized as “singular individuals fronting 
dangerous and stupendous landscapes,” insisting that “the 
drama of exotic new landscapes has always central to the 
imperial experience” so that an account of empire “had 
to be about travel.” Repeatedly he finds the U.S. military 
to have been reinvigorated by its active service in Iraq 
and Afghanistan: “When you scratched the surface of 
airmen’s emotions, you learned that they too, like Ma-
rine and Army grunts, saw the pre-9/11 period as a bad 
dream—a time when, even during the air campaigns in 
the Balkans, risk was not tolerated in the way it was now” 
(Kaplan 2008, 63).
The imperial future for the United States, as described by 
Kaplan, has two strands. The first are small-scale activi-
ties. Among these is the training of “indigenous troops” 
in foreign places, or what he calls “imperial maintenance” 
(Kaplan 2008, 5). They also include preserving access to 
foreign facilities, such as airfields or warehoused supplies. 
Beyond this, there are the unconventional, counterterror-
ism actions of covert forces, including murders, kidnap-
ping, psychological warfare, sabotage, and interrogations. 
This dispersed militarism was compared by troops to the 
wars against indigenous peoples in the nineteenth-centu-
ry United States, although they spoke in somewhat differ-
ent terms: “‘Welcome to Injun Country’ was the refrain 
I heard from troops from Colombia to the Philippines, 
including Afghanistan and Iraq. … The War on Terror-
ism was really about taming the frontier” (Kaplan 2005, 
4). One officer at the Pentagon told Kaplan (2008, 9) that 
“[a]fter Iraq, we hope not to be invading a big country 
for a long time, so we’ll be reduced to low-profile raiding, 
which the U.S. military has a very long and venerable 
tradition of from the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.” Kaplan (2008, 8) described a preventative war on 
terror that conflated humanitarian and combat prepara-
tions: “the logistics of humanitarian assistance were simi-
lar to the logistics of war: both demanded fast infiltration 
and the movement of men and equipment to a zone of ac-
tivity. It was all about access.” And access came with local 
engagement: “The way to avoid future quagmires was to 
be engaged in more places, not fewer” (Kaplan 2008, 8).
Access requires the military to win hearts and minds 
and, for Kaplan, that work can best be motivated in ways 
that eerily recall the business of travel, and travel writ-
ing. There is, for Kaplan (2004, 24), a love of landscape 
that rises to a passion: “The more beautiful the landscape 
the more you want to devour its past and culture: all in-
tellectual life rests ultimately on aesthetics.” Beauty and 
possession are related. In the Philippines, he describes a 
night out with some members of a Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force: “We were accompanied by the girls who 
did the team laundry, for $20 per month. These girls were 
typical Filipinas: small-boned, symmetrically featured, 
and walnut-complexioned beauties, with twangy, mellow 
Spanish-style voices and subservient oriental manners, a 
devouring mix of South America and Asia” (Kaplan 2005, 
158). There is a conflation of landscape and women in the 
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138 THE AAG REVIEW OF BOOKS
way he develops this theme over the next few pages. He 
writes that “Western men simply loved Asia” and “[p]ar-
ticularly in the Philippines, which was a land of smiling 
and stunning women” (Kaplan 2005, 161). For the men of 
the Joint Special Operations Task Force, sexual relations 
with local women were disallowed by military regulations 
“[a]nd that was a shame, at least in my opinion” (Kaplan 
2005, 158), for elsewhere in the Philippines when married 
quarters were removed from bases and “soldiers interacted 
more with the locals,” the consequence was “a better rela-
tionship with the immediate environment” (Kaplan 2005, 
175). In Thailand, he finds that the local relationships on 
which the United States can rely have been built by ex-
soldiers who stayed behind after military service having 
“married locally. They constituted proof that you could 
serve your country best by loving the indigenous culture 
most” (Kaplan 2008, 82). There is not a trace of irony, 
or embarrassment, in this explication of the relations be-
tween aesthetics and empire.
Alongside the aesthetics of small-scale engagement, Ka-
plan also sketches a broader-scale strategic strand of U.S. 
imperialism. Here, he notes that “our world is increasingly 
one without a superpower” for the rise of countries once 
judged underdeveloped is “leveling the geopolitical play-
ing field” (Kaplan 2011a, 327). Kaplan (2011c) suggests 
that in the past decade the world has passed beyond the 
post-Cold War moment of singular U.S. military superi-
ority: “Although U.S. soldiers and marines have slogged 
their way through the mountains of Afghanistan and 
the alleyways of Iraq, countries of the Indo-Pacific region 
have been quietly building their maritime, air, cyber and 
space capacities.” This is the arena for the high-tech war-
fare of air forces and navies. It is also the context for Ka-
plan’s (2011b, 168) reflections on the relations between 
maps and chaps, or between those “vast impersonal forces 
… about which we can do little” and the singular indi-
viduals who, “against great odds, succeed at overcoming 
these very forces.” Johnston (2013) has already reviewed 
Kaplan’s (2012) broadly environmentalist argument in 
these pages, but it is worth noting again just how static 
is the geography that is having its revenge: “Geography is 
merely the unchanging backdrop against which the battle 
of ideas plays out” (2011b, 177), so that insofar as deter-
minism is defied, geography is, too.
And still, there might be grandeur yet in a geographi-
cal view of things. It is striking that in Monsoon, Kaplan 
(2011b) describes the intense and long-standing interac-
tions between societies distributed around the Indo-Pa-
cific region. He describes how the monsoon winds helped 
shape a trading system that flung far and wide people, 
products, and philosophies. These interactions had a his-
torical geography that belies the notion that identities are 
shaped predominantly by physical environments, static 
or dynamic. Kaplan also describes these trading systems 
as creating interdependencies that give many an interest 
in a sort of maritime commons. Those relations likewise 
develop from and into a sort of political geography. The 
Revenge of Geography begins by allowing the idealists of 
Mitteleuropa to float the notion that “a culture in and of 
itself comprised a geography every bit as much as a moun-
tain range did, or every bit as much as Soviet tanks did,” 
before bringing in the geographical realists to insist that 
the notion “simply has no reality on the relief map” (Ka-
plan 2012, 6, 9). The book closes, however, with Kaplan 
(2012, 332) urging the United States to “prepare the world 
for its own obsolescence. That way it labors for a pur-
pose, and not merely to enjoy power for its own sake.” By 
drawing China into a set of economic interdependencies 
across the Indo-Pacific region, Kaplan (2012, 219) would 
hope that the United States might “make a [straits] war 
too costly for China to seriously contemplate.” If China 
enters alliances to share the burden of maintaining the 
maritime commons, then, suggests Kaplan (2012, 346), a 
new “stability guaranteed by a balance of power in the 
Eastern Hemisphere” might allow the United States “to 
advance nothing less than the liberal intellectual cause 
of a Mitteleuropa writ large across the globe.”
This is probably as far as a broadly realist analysis can go, 
and it is certainly better than the force majeure celebrated 
in Kaplan’s (2002) earlier calls for “warrior politics.” The 
realist emphasis on balancing the relative forces of states, 
however, leaves out of the picture the grid of inequality 
and the related issue of the relations between states and 
corporations. For all his concern with empire, there is 
precious little here about the economics of imperialism. 
After all, corporations compete for resources and impli-
cate states in their wake. And to speak of the global war 
on terror as “taming the frontier” (Kaplan 2005, 4) in-
sults the First Nations peoples who were dispossessed and 
slaughtered. Geopolitics too often inherits the unexam-
ined privilege of travel.
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